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THE NEW ORIGINALIST MANIFESTO
CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE.
Lawrence B. Solum1 and Robert W. Bennett. 2 Ithaca: Cornell
University Press. 2011. Pp. ix + 210. $29.95 (Cloth).
James E. Fleming'
INTRODUCTION
Lawrence B. Solum and Robert W. Bennett's excellent
book, Constitutional Originalism: A Debate, calls to mind a
famous book in political philosophy, J.J.C. Smart and Bernard
Williams's Utilitarianism: For and Against. 4 Both works pair two
spirited yet fair-minded scholars in a constructive debate
between two competing views prevalent in their fields.
Originalism has a reasonable, programmatic, and inclusive
proponent in Solum, and living constitutionalism has a capable,
pragmatic, and effective champion in Bennett.
In this essay, I shall not judge the debate between Solum
and Bennett. Instead, I shall focus on Solum's contribution,
interpreting it as a new originalist manifesto. I shall extend the
debate, carrying on what I believe is an equally important debate
between originalism and what Ronald Dworkin called a "moral
reading" of the Constitution and what I call a "Constitutionperfecting theory." 5 Some readers may think that Dworkin's and
1. John Carroll Research Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
2. Nathaniel L. Nathanson Professor of Law, Northwestern University Law
School.
3. Professor of Law, The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in
Law, and Associate Dean for Research and Intellectual Life, Boston University School
of Law. In Part IV, I incorporate a paper I presented at a panel on "The Original
Meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause," held at the Annual Meeting of the Law
and Society Association, Denver, May 28, 2009. The panel, coincidentally, was organized
by Larry Solum and included discussion with Larry and Randy Barnett about original
public meaning originalism. Thanks to Courtney Gesualdi for help with this piece.
4.

J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST

(1973).
5.

RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2-3 (1996); JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF AUTONOMY 16,210-11 (2006).

539

540

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 28:539

my approaches are versions of living constitutionalism, but they
are importantly different from it. I shall suggest that the
prospects for reconciliation between Solun1's new originalism
and moral readings are greater than those between his new
originalism and living constitutionalism. The basic reason is that
the new originalists and moral readers share a commitment to
constitutional fidelity: to interpretation and construction that
best fits and justifies the Constitution. Living constitutionalists
characteristically are more pragmatic, instrurnentalist, and
forward-looking in their approaches to the Constitution and, as
such, tend to be anti-fidelity. This essay will further my book in
progress, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, which defends a
moral reading or Constitution-perfecting theory as a conception
of constitutional fidelity that is superior to originalism, however
conceived.(\
At the outset, I should say that Solum is the ideal scholar
for the project of writing a new originalist manifesto. He fairly
concedes many of the flaws in the old originalism, with an
openness to criticism and a generosity of spirit that are not
always present in originalists. He candidly grants that originalism
has evolved-that it is a family of theories rather than one
coherent, unified view- and that the new originalism is a work
in progress (pp. 2, 7-11 ). He formulates the new originalism
inclusively, seeking and articulating common ground among
competing theories in a constructive spirit. Solurn is somewhat
unusual in not coming to his originalism for political reasons.
Many conservatives appear to embrace originalisnn because they
believe that it will support conservative outcomes. And many
liberals evidently adopt and adapt originalism because they
believe that it is their best hope to persuade conservative judges:
if you can't beat them, join them. Solum has neither motivation.
He seems to come to his new originalism out of philosophic and
jurisprudential commitments-not to wage a counter-revolution
against the liberal Warren Court, but to correct the philosophical
and jurisprudential excesses and errors of Legal Realism and
Critical Legal Studies. As a matter of principle, he wants to get
the theory of interpretation and construction right. For these
reasons, his project has an admirable and demonstrable integrity.
In Part I, I evaluate the claim implicit in the title of Solum's
opening chapter, "We Are All Originalists Now." In Part II, I
6. JAMES E. FLEMING. FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION (under
contract with Oxford University Press) (on file with author).
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explicate Solum's formulation of the new originalism by
contrasting it with Keith Whittington's. In Part III, 1 explore
Solum's development of the distinction between interpretation
and construction. In Part IV, I show the misconceived quest for
the original public meaning. In Part V, I take up the possibility
of reconciliation between the new originalism and living
constitutionalism, suggesting that such prospects are better for
the new originalism and moral readings. Finally, in Part VI, I
make explicit the missing (or implicit) argument for the new
originalism fron1 constitutional perfectionism: an argument
deriving from the aspiration to fidelity to our imperfect
Constitution.
I. ARE WE ALL ORIGINALISTS NOW? EVIDENTLY SO,

YET DEFINITELY NOT!
In recent years, many have posed the question, "Are we all
originalists now?" In response, I have written an article entitled,
Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Nott By contrast, Solum
replies with his title, We Are All Originalists Now (p. 1). The
answer to the question depends, as he recognizes, on "what one
means by originalism" and whether we define it exclusively or
inclusively (pp. 61-62) (emphasis in the original).
In defining originalism, Solum distills an elegant framework
with four basic ideas. It is worth quoting in full:
• The fixation thesis: The linguistic meaning of the
constitutional text was fixed at the time each provision
was framed and ratified.
• The public meaning thesis: Constitutional meaning is fixed
by the understanding of the words and phrases and the
grammar and syntax that characterized the linguistic
practices of the public and not by the intentions of the
framers.
• The textual constraint thesis: The original meaning of the
text of the Constitution has legal force: the text is law and
not a mere symbol.
• The interpretation-construction distinction: Constitutional
practice includes two distinct activities: (I) constitutional
interpretation, which discerns the linguistic meaning of

7. James E. Fleming, Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!, 92
(forthcoming 2013).

TEX.

L.
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the text, and (2) constitutional construction, which
determines the legal effect of the text. (p. 4)

Solum aspires to understand originalism (and, for that matter,
living constitutionalism) "in their best light-in their most
sophisticated and defensible versions" (p. 5). I shall come back
to this Dworkinian-sounding formulation at the end.
If we define originalism inclusively enough, we might say
that we evidently are all originalists now. Indeed, we might just
define originalism so broadly that even I would no longer hope
that we are not all originalists now! Applying Solum's
framework, we would conclude that Jack Balkin, with his selfdescribed living originalist method of text and principle,
definitely is a new originalist.H Ronald Dworkin, with his moral
9
reading of the Constitution, surely also is. Sotirios A. Barber
and I, with our philosophic approach to constitutional
interpretation (and my own "Constitution-perfecting theory"),
are as well. 10 So, too, are reasonable, bounded, and grounded
versions of living constitutionalism. All of these theories
evidently can accept the four theses quoted above. Under
Solum's formulation, originalism clearly is a big tent-charitable,
magnanimous, and inclusionary-rather than the dogmatic,
scolding, and exclusionary outlook that we see in originalist
works like Robert Bark's The Tempting of America and Antonin
Scalia's A Matter of Interpretation.''
But if we define originalism so inclusively- and we are all
now in this big tent-it may not be very useful to say that we are
all originalists now. We may obscure our differences more than
elucidating common ground. For we would persist in most of our
theoretical disagreements-it is just that we would say that the
disagreements are among varieties of so-called originalism. And
the debates concerning interpretation and construction, thus
recast or translated, would go on much as before.
Despite the implication of his title, Solum's own analysis
refutes the claim that we are all originalists now. 'Who, from the
standpoint of his framework, is not a new originalist? First, the
old originalists are not. As Solum acknowledges, they reject the
See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING 0RIGINALISM (2011).
See DWORKIN, supra note 5.
See SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS (2007); FLEMING, supra note 5.
11. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
8.
9.
10.

OF THE LAW (1990): ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
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public meaning thesis and the interpretation-construction
distinction thesis (pp. 36, 53-54). For them, interpretation is a
matter of discovering determinative intentions of the Framers
and construction is illegitimate government by judiciary. Second,
many contemporary originalists- those who might not style
themselves old originalists but who reject the large role that the
new originalism recognizes for construction- are not new
originalists. Still, Solum does not exclude these two varieties
from the big tent of originalism. He says that only two of the
four commitments are necessary for originalism: the fixation
thesis and the textual constraint thesis (pp. 35-36). Both of these
varieties accept these two theses. And at one point, he refers to
the "truism" of the fixation thesis and the "mundane[ ness]" of
the textual constraint thesis (pp. 53-54). Here, he implicitly
admits just how thin and capacious these two theses are, and
thus how big the tent of originalism is.
Third, despite Solum's magnanimous gestures toward
reconciliation of the new originalism with living constitutionalism, he rejects many forms of the latter as beyond the pale.
He criticizes strong forms of living constitutionalism growing out
of Legal Realism or Critical Legal Studies precisely because they
are not originalist, even in his capacious sense: they are
pragmatic, instrumentalist, and forward-looking, rejecting even
the relatively thin constraints that the new originalism would
require of them (pp. 40, 50, 74). For them, evidently, there is
only construction; interpretation and construction are radically
indeterminate. He attributes to such living constitutionalists the
views that the text and original public meaning do not constrain
interpretation and construction; that constitutional interpretation empowers judges to amend the Constitution; and that
justice trumps the constitutional text (pp. 19-20, 47-49, 60). He
ridicules many "so-called theories" of living constitutionalism as
not being "real theories" but instead "pale imitations, mere
gestures and hints" (pp. 74-75). In fact, despite the generally
inclusionary tone of Solum's work, I have not seen such spirited
attacks on living constitutionalism since reading Bork's The
12
Tempting of America and Scalia's A Matter of Interpretation.
Thus, when all is said and done, according to Solum himself,
we definitely are not all originalists now.

12.

BORK, supra

note 11, at 167; SCALIA, supra note 11, at 38-47, 144-49.
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II. THE NEW ORIGINALISMS
Next, I shall explicate Solum's understanding of the new
originalism by contrasting it with Whittington's.
A. WHAT IS THE NEW 0RIGINALISM? TAKE ONE:
WHITTINGTON

What is the new originalism? This question presupposes
three prior questions: What is the old originalism? Who are the
old originalists? And why have many constitutional scholars and
jurists sought to move beyond old originalisrn to the new
originalism?
What? The old originalism is an ism-a conservative
ideology that emerged in reaction to the Warren Court (and
early Burger Court). Before President Richard Nixon and
Professor Robert Bark launched their attacks on the Court,
originalism as we now know it did not exist. Constitutional
interpretation in light of original understanding 13 did exist, but
original understanding was seen as merely one source of
constitutional decision making among several- not as a general
theory of constitutional interpretation, much less the exclusive
legitimate theory. The old originalists conceive original
understanding in terms of concrete intentions of the Framers or
their original expected applications. Accordingly, they argue that
fidelity in constitutional interpretation requires following the
rules laid down by, or giving effect to the relatively specific
original understanding of, the Framers of the Constitution. And
they argue that these concrete intentions or original expected
applications are determinative concerning constitutional
doctrine.
Who? The old originalists include, most prorninently, Bark
and Raoul Berger. 14
Why? The old originalism is vulnerable to dispositive
criticisms. In his book, Constitutional Interpretation, Keith
Whittington has forthrightly addressed many of these criticisms,
fo~ ex~mRle, that it was circular, question--begging, and
axiomatic.·
13. In using the word "original understanding," I am not expressing a position on
the debates between intention of the Framers originalism and original public meaning
originalism. I am using it as a generic term.
14. See, e.g, RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

15.

KEITH

(1977).

E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL
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What is the new originalism? Who are the new originalists?
And what is new about their originalism? Whittington provides
answers in offering a new originalism. Before reading his article
16
on "The New Originalism," I had thought that the new,
improved originalists would be scholars and jurists who seek to
reconstruct originalism to correct the theoretical flaws of the old
originalism, or at least to bolster it against powerful criticisms.
But Whittington, with startling and refreshing frankness,
provides a rather different account: He says that the new
originalists are conservatives in power, whereas the old
17
originalists were conservatives in the minority! His account of
the old originalism is quite similar to mine: it emerged as a
conservative reaction against the Warren Court. 1s Now that
conservatives have control of the judiciary, Whittington says,
originalists need to move from being largely reactive and critical
to developing "a governing philosophy appropriate to guide
19
majority opinions, [and] not just fill dissents." Enter the new
originalism.
As a governing conservative constitutional theory,
Whittington suggests, the new originalism "is less likely to
20
emphasize a primary commitment to judicial restraint." Indeed.
"First, there seems to be less emphasis on the capacity of
21
originalism to limit the discretion of the judge." "Second, there
is also a loosening of the connection between originalism and
22
judicial deference to legislative majorities." Instead, "[t]he
primary virtue claimed by the new originalism is one of
constitutional fidelity, not of judicial restraint or democratic
majoritarianism." 23 In sum, Whittington argues, "[t]he new
originalism does not require that judges get out of the way of
legislatures. It requires judges to uphold the original
24
Constitution- nothing more, but also nothing less. " (I shall
return to these three arguments for, or asserted virtues of,
originalism below.)
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999).
16. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. 1. L. & PUB. POL'Y 599
(2004). Here I draw from my criticism of Whittington in BARBER & FLEMING. supra note

10, at 92-93.
17. Whittington, supra note 16, at 604.
18. /d. at 599-602.
19. Jd. at 604.
20. /d. at 608.
21. /d.
22. /d. at 609.
23. /d. at 608-09.
24. /d.
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B. WHAT IS THE NEW ORIGINALISM? TAKE T\VO: SOLUM
Solum's and Whittington's accounts of the old originalism
are similar. And their accounts of the new originalism are similar
in two respects. Solum's new originalism, like Whittington's,
stresses: (1) original public meaning (as contrasted with the old
originalists' emphasis on the intention of the Framers or their
original expected applications), and (2) the significance of the
distinction between interpretation and construction (as
contrasted with the old originalists' rejection of construction as
illegitimate) (p. 36).
But Solum's new originalism is significantly different.
Whittington developed his new originalism to replace the old
originalists' negative reaction against the liberal Warren Court
with a governing constitutional theory for conservative judges,
now that they are in power. Solum, by contrast, developed his
new originalism to overcome the theoretical errors and excesses
not only of the old originalists but also of Legal Realism and
Critical Legal Studies. In fact, he wants to acknowledge the
conservative ideology of the old originalists but to distance that
from the new originalism as a constitutional theory, and not a
political ideology (p. 64 ).
Moreover, Solum's new originalism really is a
reconstruction to correct the theoretical flaws in the old
originalism. He rejects most of the old originalists' conception of
constitutional interpretation as indefensible (pp. 7-11, 20-22).
He also repudiates the old originalists' conception of the
Constitution as practically a code of determinate rules and
concrete expected applications. On his understanding, original
public meaning is more abstract, vague, and underdeterminedin part because he conceives some of the Constitution's
commitments as general standards or abstract principles rather
than as concrete, determinate rules (pp. 22, 24-25). Furthermore, Solum advances a very different understanding of
construction than Whittington. For Whittington, at least in his
initial formulation, interpretation is for judges and construction
25
is for legislators and executives. For Solum, construction is also
for judges in developing constitutional doctrine where
interpretation is underdeterminate (pp. 22-24 ). Solum implicitly
acknowledges this difference when he characterizes
Whittington's view as the model of construction as politics (as
25. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1-19 (1999).

CONSTRUCTION:

DIVIDED
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distinguished from Balkin's model of construction as principle):
with courts deferring in the construction zone and letting
political institutions do the construction (pp. 69-70). Below I
suggest that there are similarities between Solum's and Balkin's
conceptions of construction.
The upshot-to which I return-is that Solum's new
originalism is more amenable to reconciliation with moral
readings than is Whittington's.
In the next two sections, I assess Solum's new originalism in
its own right, focusing on the significance of the distinction
between interpretation and construction and the misconceived
quest for the original public meaning.
Ill. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION

Let's be clear about what Solum claims about the
significance of the distinction between interpretation and
construction. In explaining this distinction, he invokes H.L.A.
Hart's well-known formulation concerning the core and
penumbra (p. 22). He presents the core as a zone for
interpretation and the penumbra as a zone for construction. He
contends that hard cases, by definition, are underdetermined by
interpretation of original public meaning and so require
construction (pp. 22-23).
Furthermore, Solum says that originalism is a theory of
interpretation, not a theory of construction. In developing the
interpretation-construction distinction, Solum plainly states:
"Originalism itself does not have a theory of constitutional construction" (p. 60). He also states: "Whereof originalism cannot
speak, thereof it must be silent" (p. 26). Even though construction in hard cases lies beyond interpretation (and thus
beyond originalism), he claims that the new originalists insist that
original public meaning should constrain construction (p. 26).
I shall make two general observations before going further
into Solum's conception of construction. First, Solum concedes
that much that is important in constitutional law goes on in the
construction zone in deciding hard cases and developing
constitutional doctrine. We might doubt how much of
importance in constitutional law is resolved through interpretation of original public meaning (a point to which I return in
showing the misconceived quest for the original public meaning).
I suspect that Solum would find greater agreement with his
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analysis of interpretation and construction among living
constitutionalists and moral readers than among most
conventional originalists: for living constitutionalists and moral
readers would agree that hard cases lie in the construction zone,
and that interpretation of original public meaning does not
determine the outcomes in these disputes. But old originalists
and many other contemporary originalists would reject these
claims as capitulations. Some, like the old originalists, would
insist that interpretation is determinative both in deciding hard
cases and developing constitutional doctrine (pp. 20-22). Others
would deny the necessity or the legitimacy of construction. And
some who accept the legitimacy of construction would go along
with Whittington in adopting what Solum calls the model of
construction as politics: they would say that interpretation is for
courts and construction is for legislatures and executives (pp. 6970).
Second, what Solum says about how construction should
proceed- how he proposes to build out doctrine and decide hard
cases in the construction zone-and about how original public
meaning should constrain construction even if it does not
determine it, is compatible with a moral reading. In defending
this view, I shall focus on two things he says about originalism in
relation to construction. One, Solum states: "originalists can and
should agree that constitutional construction (as currently
practiced) involves a plurality of methods-purposes, structure,
precedent, and all the rest" (p. 60). He rejects the common living
constitutionalist argument that the very existence of "multiple
modalities" shows the impossibility of originalism (p. 59). He
contends instead that "these methods are properly brought to
bear on the task of constitutional construction" (p. 60). Thus, he
practically makes peace with living constitutionalism concerning
the multiple modalities of argument in the construction zone.
Whittington recently has taken a similar approach in recognizing
what he calls "pluralism within originalism" or how originalist
arguments exist in an environment of "pluralism In
26
constitutional interpretation"
(or, Solum would insist,
construction).
Two, Solum mentions three available models of
construction as eligible within the new originalism (pp. 69-70).

26. Keith E. Whittington, On Pluralism within Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF
0RIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 70 (Grant Huscroft &
Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011 ).
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1. Construction as politics (associated with Whittington):

"when judges leave the realm of constitutional
interpretation and enter the construction zone, they
defer to the decisions made by the political processes."
2. Construction as principle (associated with Balkin): "[i]n
the construction zone, judges should aim to create
constitutional doctrines that comport with political ideals
for which the general, abstract, and vague provisions of
the Constitution aim."
3. Construction by original methods (inspired by the work
of John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport but not their
own view): "when modern courts engage in
constitutional construction, they should employ" the
original methods in use when the Constitution was
adopted.
Solum does not exactly say which model of construction is
the most promising for the new originalism that he himself
proposes. Doing so, I suppose, would be out of keeping with the
spirit of an ecumenical new originalist manifesto. But, as stated
above, there are significant differences between Whittington's
model of construction as politics and Solum's approach to
construction. For Whittington, again, interpretation is for judges
and construction is for legislatures and executives. For Solum, by
contrast, construction is also for judges in developing constitutional doctrine where interpretation is underdeterminative (pp.
22-23). Furthermore, it does not appear that Solum himself
would emphasize construction by original methods. I interpret
him as putting this model forward in the spirit of an inclusive
manifesto rather than as advocating it as the best approach to
construction. Finally, there is good reason to believe that Solum
thinks that Balkin's model of construction as principle is the
most promising approach for the new originalism that he himself
advocates. What is more, Balkin's is the most promising model
for a reconciliation of originalism and living constitutionalism;
27
indeed, Balkin calls his new originalism "living originalism."
There is also considerable hope for reconciliation between
the new originalism and moral readings regarding construction.
First, moral readers like Barber and I deploy a fusion of
approaches in what Solum calls "the construction zone." "Within
such a fusion, we . . . understand text, consensus, intentions,

27.

BALKIN, supra

note 8.
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structures, and doctrines not as alternatives to but as sites of
philosophic reflection and choice about the best understanding
of our constitutional commitments. ,zR Second, moral readers
should embrace Balkin's model of construction as the method of
text and principle. In fact, I have argued that Balkin's theory is a
moral reading of the Constitution. 29 For Balkin conceives the
Constitution as embodying not only rules but also general
standards and abstract principles. 30 He recognizes that in
interpreting these general standards and abstract principles, we
have to make moral and political judgments concerning the best
understanding of our commitments; history alone does not make
those judgments for us in rule-like fashion. 31 Moreover, there are
unmistakable affinities between Balkin's commitment to
interpret and construct the Constitution so as to redeem our
faith in its promises and aspirations, and a moral reading's
commitment to interpret and construct the Constitution so as to
make it the best it can be. 32
Thus, if Solum's new originalism embraces Balkin's method
of text and principle- as an approach to interpretation and
construction -it has much in common with a moral reading.
In the next section, I raise some doubts about Solum's new
originalist quest for the original public meaning.
IV. THE MISCONCEIVED QUEST FOR THE ORIGINAL
PUBLIC MEANING
The inspiration for the title of this section is, of course, Paul
Brest's classic article, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding." 33 Solum refers to Brest's article at several
points (pp. 8, 14, 160). The new originalists may have reconceived the quest of the old originalists-from intention of the
Framers or their original expected applications to original public
meaning- but the new quest is likewise misconceived.
The quest for the original public meaning is misconceived
because on most important provisions, there will not be a
definitive original public meaning that will be useful in resolving
28. BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 10, at 190.
29. James E. Fleming, The Balkinization of Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 669,
675-79.
30. /d. at 676.
31. BALKIN, supra note 8, at 23-34.
32. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 255 (1986).
33. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 234 (1980).
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our disagreements, much less resolving hard cases. Let me give a
hypothetical example of constitutional amendment and
interpretation. Let's imagine that, in the near future, the
Supreme Court overturns Lawrence v. Texai 4 - which had
recognized a right of gays and lesbians to privacy or autonomyeven as our constitutional culture has accepted it, and has come
not merely to tolerate but to respect gays and lesbians as equal
citizens. Let's imagine that We the People then amend the
Constitution by adopting the following Twenty-Eighth
Amendment: "Well-ordered liberty being necessary to the
happiness of a free state, the right to autonomy shall not be
infringed."
How would debates about the original public meaning of
the Twenty-Eighth Amendment likely proceed? Let's distinguish
two quite different understandings, which parallel recognizable
disagreements between originalists and moral readers of the
Constitution. On the one hand, originalists like Scalia, who want
to construe constitutional language specifically, might say that
the original public meaning was simply, specifically, and
exclusively to reinstate the narrow holding in Lawrence. Such
originalists might say that the Twenty-Eighth Amendment
protects only the right of gays and lesbians to engage in "deviate
sexual intercourse," as the Texas statute invalidated in Lawrence
had put it, 35 or the right of gays and lesbians to engage in
"homosexual sodomy," as Justice White had put it in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 36 which was overruled in Lawrence. On their view, the
Twenty-Eighth Amendment would be no more abstract a
commitment to a right to autonomy than that. They would hold
this view, not because they made an objective historical inquiry
into original public meaning as a matter of empirical fact, but
because of prior jurisprudential assumptions and commitments
about what an original public meaning must be- and about the
character of the Constitution, constitutional interpretation, and
constitutional amendment. On their view, that evidently abstract
language in the Twenty-Eighth Amendment simply has to
embody specific meanings.
On the other hand, moral readers, who conceive the
Constitution as a charter of abstract commitments, would likely
say that the original public meaning was nothing less than to
34.
35.
36.

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Jd. at 563.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
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ratify the right to autonomy that the Suprerne Court had
developed through the line of cases from Meyer and Pierce on
37
through Griswold, Roe, Casey, and Lawrence. Ivloreover, they
would claim that the original public meaning was to authorize
the Supreme Court to go on as it had before in these cases
elaborating our basic commitment to a right to autonomy.
Indeed, they might go further and claim that the Constitution,
properly interpreted, should protect whatever rights of
autonomy we and the Supreme Court decide over time are
essential to the concept of well-ordered liberty and autonomy.
They would take this view, not because they made an objective
historical inquiry into original public meaning as a matter of
empirical fact, but because of prior jurisprudential assumptions
and commitments about the character of the Constitution,
constitutional interpretation, and constitutional am.endment. On
their view, that evidently abstract language in the Twenty-Eighth
Amendment simply has to embody abstract commitments.
Let's observe that there would be no independent original
public meaning- as a matter of history- that either side could
resort to in order to definitively resolve their disagreements.
Proponents of both understandings of the Twenty-Eighth
Amendment would claim that their understandings were more
faithful to the original public meaning. There would not be son1e
definitive original public meaning of the words "right to
autonomy" out there in our constitutional culture that would
resolve our disputes- any more than there is a core public
meaning of a right to autonomy out there right now.
Furthermore, there is no lawyerly term of art, "right to
autonomy," to which we could resort to resolve disagreement
over the meaning of the right to autonomy. Those who are
learned in the law vehemently disagree among themselves about
it-along the lines sketched above-just as citizens disagree. So
likewise it is with the Equal Protection Clause; the Due Process
Clause; the Privileges or Immunities Clause; and the First
Amendment's protections of freedom of speech, freedom of the
press, and freedom of religion. So it is and ever shall be with
significant constitutional provisions.
37. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 55S; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut,
3S1 U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See JAMES E. FLEMING &
LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES
244-67 (2013) (analyzing this line of cases protecting a "rational continuum" of ordered
liberty).
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To make a further point about the misconceived quest for
the original public meaning, I shall analyze the interpretation of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the Slaughter-House
3
Cases. x Many constitutional scholars and judges-including
liberals and conservatives alike, originalists along with moral
readers- believe that Slaughter-House was wrongly decided.
Indeed, many believe that it was a travesty. And I'll bet that
many, if they had a chance to overrule five decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court, would include Slaughter-House on their list. But
I want to ponder for a moment the likely consequences of
overruling Slaughter-House. I'll even put this in terms congenial
to new originalists like Solum. Let's imagine that we overrule
Slaughter-House and commit to return to the original public
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause (that's the part
that is supposed to be congenial to the new originalists). And
let's hypothesize that we agree that the original public meaning
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause was that it was to protect
the fundamental rights "which belong, of right, to the citizens of
all free governments" (quoting Justice Bushrod Washington's
famous formulation). 3
What would be the likely consequence of overruling
Slaughter-House and committing to carrying out the original
public meaning so conceived? In all likelihood, precious little
would change. (Sorry to prove to be so uncongenial to the new
originalists after all.) Let me explain. The Supreme Court's
gutting of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in SlaughterHouse did not stop the Court from interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect fundamental rights essential to national
citizenship (of the sort that by hypothesis it was the original
public meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause to
protect). As we all know, the Court turned to the word "liberty"
in the Due Process Clause and to the Equal Protection Clause
(the fundamental rights and interests strand) to do so.
For years, people have argued for reviving the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, since its language (and original public
meaning) more comfortably can bear the work of protecting
fundamental rights essential to national citizenship. They also
have argued that doing so would avoid common objections to
using the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses to protect
l)

38. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
39. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230)
(Washington, J., riding circuit).

554

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 28:539

such rights. The objections to using the Due Process Clause are
familiar: it's the Due Process Clause (not the Due Liberty
Clause). On this view, the government may treat everyone
poorly, provided it follows established procedures for doing so.
The objections to using the Equal Protection Clause to protect
fundamental rights essential to national citizenship are also
familiar: it's the Equal Protection Clause (not the Just Protection
Clause). On this view, the government could satisfy its
requirements by treating everyone equally unjustly.
What would happen if we were to overrule Slaughter-House
and revive the Privileges or Immunities Clause as an alternative
basis for protecting fundamental rights essential to national
citizenship? Let's imagine that Balkin, a new originalist
concerned with fidelity to the original public meaning of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, were to propose that we
reconceive all of the substantive due process and fundamental
rights equal protection cases as instead interpretations or
constructions of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. (In fact, he
40
has made an argument along such lines. )
I in1agine that some readers are thinking that originalists
like Scalia could never again object to protecting substantive
fundamental rights on the ~round that the Due Process Clause is
the Due Process Clause, 1 for the Privileges or Immunities
Clause does not contain any language to suggest that it would
protect only processual fundamental rights. And I suppose that
some readers are thinking as well that Scalia could never again
object to protecting unenumerated fundamental rights as such,
on the ground that they are unenumerated. 42 A.fter all, the
Privileges or Immunities Clause does not purport to enumerate
the fundamental rights essential to national citizenship, such that
we might infer that if an asserted fundamental right is not
enumerated it is not protected (leaving aside the Ninth
Amendment).
Well, think again. I daresay that Scalia would argue that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause protects only processual rightshe would argue that the character of our democratic system
entails that, in the absence of express constitutional provisions,
the Constitution protects only processual rights. A.nd I daresay
40. BALKIN, supra note 8, at 183-219.
41. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 592 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
42. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 980 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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that Scalia would still object that because the Privileges or
Immunities Clause does not enumerate the rights it protects,
Justices are obligated to ignore it, as if its meaning had been
"obliterated past deciphering by an inkblot," to recall Bork. 43 He
would read the evidence of the original public meaning through
the lens of his prior jurisprudential assumptions and
commitments about the character of our constitutional rights (as
enumerated and processual) as well as about the character of
interpretation (to be interpretable, a provision must enumerate
its contents and it must be rule-like rather than abstract
principle-like).
And so, notwithstanding a hypothetical overruling of
Slaughter-House, the arguments about what fundamental rights
of national citizenship the Constitution protects through the Due
Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Privileges
or Immunities Clause would likely go on much as before.
I want to make a final point about what the world probably
would look like if we were to overrule Slaughter-House, revive
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and commit to carrying out
its original public meaning. Justice Clarence Thomas indicated
his openness to doing just that in dissent in Saenz v. Roe. 44
Indeed, he stated there that Slaughter-House's gutting of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause has contributed to what he sees
45
as the disarray of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. As I
interpret his dissent, he would overrule all of the substantive due
process cases, overrule all of the fundamental rights equal
protection cases, and interpret the Privileges or Immunities
Clause in light of his conception of its original public meaning.
What do you suppose Thomas would interpret the Privileges or
Immunities Clause to protect? I would expect primarily
economic liberties of the sort Justice Field in dissent in
Slaughter-House expected it to protect, and of the sort that the
Supreme Court protected under the Due Process Clause during
46
the era of Lochner.
The larger point here, again, is that there is no definitive
original public meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
that, if only we could recover it, would enable us to proceed in
constitutional interpretation or construction without the
43. BORK, supra note 11, at 166.
44. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 527-28 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
45. Jd.
46. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36,
96-97 (Field, J., dissenting).
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disagreements that we presently have. Conservatives like
Thomas would argue for one set of privileges or immunities of
national citizenship; liberals would argue for another. Both
would do so in the garb of fidelity to original public meaning.
Both would argue that their interpretations are, as Balkin puts it,
necessary to redeem the promises of the Constitution.
Disagreement about what fundamental rights are essential to
national citizenship would continue, much as before, only now
under the Privileges or Immunities Clause as well as under the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Disagreement about
the basic character of the Constitution, constitutional
interpretation, and constitutional amendment would continue
much as before. The debate, under the guise of arguments about
fidelity to original public meaning, is a debate among competing
moral readings of the Constitution. Any quest for original public
meaning that seeks to deny or avoid the moral reading of the
Constitution is misconceived.
V. THE PROSPECTS FOR RECONCILIATION BETWEEN
THE NEW ORIGINALISM AND LIVING
CONSTITUTIONALISM (OR MORAL REA.DINGS)
What are the prospects for reconciliation between
originalism and living constitutionalism? There is no hope
regarding the old originalism and even reasonable versions of
living constitutionalism (p. 67). Again, according to Solum, the
old originalists believe that interpretation is determinative and
construction is illegitimate (p. 68). Solum holds out the
possibility of a "compatibilism" between new originalism and
certain reasonable versions of living constitutionalism (pp. 6769). There would be agreement in broad tern1s concerning
interpretation in the core and construction in the penumbra (pp.
67-68). There might be disagreement about how construction
should be carried out. But there might be broad agreement
about our constitutional practice as including multiple modalities
as mentioned above. And there might be broad agreement in
support of Balkin's living originalist method of text and
principle.
The prospects for reconciliation of the new originalism and
moral readings might be more promising. Again, 1nany versions
of living constitutionalism, with their pragmatic, instrumentalist,
and forward-looking attitudes, along with their views of radical
indeterminacy, are deeply at odds with originalism, however
conceived. But moral readers like Dworkin and I reject the
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pragmatic, instrumentalist, and forward-looking attitudes, as
well as the radical indeterminacy, of such versions of living
47
constitutionalism. In these respects, such moral readers have
affinities with Solum's new originalism. And I have already
shown the general affinities between the new originalism and
moral readings concerning interpretation and construction.
As evidence that the new originalists might view moral
readers as good candidates for reconciliation, consider the
following. Balkin's living originalism, which is a form of new
originalism, is also a moral reading. 4H Whittington has interpreted
Dworkin's theory as a form of abstract originalism. 49 Solum
himself, in criticizing what he calls Dworkin's view of the "unity
of interpretation," constructed an "alternative Dworkin" who
for all intents and purposes is a new originalist who accepts the
interpretation-construction distinction. 5° Finally, Barber and I
allowed our philosophic approach to constitutional interpretation to be characterized as an abstract originalism.~'
I venture to suggest that Solum's reasonable, programmatic,
and inclusive manifesto has made the new originalism the best it
can be; as such, it is amenable to reconciliation with a moral
reading that interprets the Constitution so as to make it the best
it can be.
VI. THE MISSING ARGUMENT FROM
CONSTITUTIONAL PERFECTIONISM (OR FROM THE
ASPIRATION TO FIDELITY TO OlJR IMPERFECT
CONSTITUTION)
Finally, I want to make explicit the missing (or implicit)
argument for the new originalism from constitutional
perfectionism: an argument rooted in the aspiration to fidelity to
our imperfect Constitution. Making this argument will further
demonstrate the promise for a reconciliation of the new
originalism and moral readings. Unlike many originalists, who
47. See BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 10, at xiii (agreeing with Dworkin's moral
readings approach); DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 7-8 (arguing for the moral reading as the
"natural [or faithful] reading" of the Bill of Rights).
48. Fleming, supra note 29, at 675-79 (interpreting Balkin's "living originalism" as a
moral reading of the Constitution).
49. Keith E. Whittington, Dworkin's "Origina/ism ": The Role of intentions in
Constitutional Interpretation, 62 REV. POL. 197. 201 (2000) (interpreting Dworkin as an
"originalist" who argues that the Founders chose abstract principles).
50. Lawrence B. Solum, The Unity of Interpretation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 551, 567-77
(2010).
51. BARBER & FLEMING. supra note 10, at 82-83, 99.
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practically assume that originalism- by definition, or
axiomatically-is the only legitimate approach to constitutional
interpretation, 52 Solum acknowledges the need to make
normative arguments for originalism (pp. 36-38). l-Ie stresses the
normative arguments that originalism is more compatible with
the rule of law and popular sovereignty than competing theories
(pp. 38-44).
But Solum's formulation of the new origina1ism undercuts
both of these arguments. First, his concessions that
interpretation underdetermines outcomes, and that the development of doctrine occurs in the construction zone, undermines his
rule of law argument that only originalism "guarantees a stable
core of constitutional doctrine" (p. 41). Indeed, on his account,
the development of doctrine takes place in the construction
zone, and originalism does not provide a theory of construction
(p. 69). Second, Solum's ideas about how we develop doctrine in
the construction zone also undermines his popular sovereignty
argument for originalism. For it turns out that "V•le the People"
when ratifying the Constitution in 1791 or ratifying the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 did not adopt determinative
answers to our questions (p. 42). And so, in constructing
doctrine, the new originalists are not simply following the rules
laid down by "We the People" (p. 42). Thus, even on Solum's
account, the decisions made by the popular sovereign in the past
are underdeterminative; to that degree, the argument for
originalism from popular sovereignty is attenuated.
Balkin's new originalism stresses a normative argument
from the aspiration to fidelity to our imperfect Constitution. He
recognizes that the Constitution in practice is highly imperfect;
yet he argues that we should interpret it so as to redeem our
faith in its pron1ises and aspirations. 53 Solum should make such
an argument as well. A form of this argument may be implicit in
his discussion of the Constitution, imperfections, and injustice.
As he sees it, we have an imperfect Constitution. It is not so
unjust that we should override the text of the Constitution in the
name of doing justice; rather it is reasonably just (pp. 47-50). In
concluding, I shall suggest that the type of theory he needs for
this very circumstance of a reasonably just but imperfect
Constitution is what I call a theory of fidelity to our imperfect

52. For a criticism of originalists who evidently take it as axiomatically given, see id.
at 104-07.
53. BALKIN, supra note~. at 74-tH.
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54

Constitution. Such a theory aspires to interpret and construct
the Constitution so as to make it the best it can be (as Dworkin
55
and I put it), or so as to redeem the promises of the (abstractly
conceived) original public meaning (as Balkin puts it).:i 6 A new
originalism that incorporated such a conception of fidelity would
be a new originalism that would be compatible with the best
form of living constitutionalism- as we see it is in Balkin's living
originalism. Such a new originalism also would be compatible
with a moral reading of the sort that Dworkin has developed,
that Barber and I have advanced in Constitutional Interpretation:
The Basic Questions, and that I am pursuing in my book in
57
progress, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution. Solum cites my
piece that previews this argument: "Fidelity to Our Imperfect
Constitution" (p. 184 n.69), but he does not explicitly do
anything with such an argument.
Solum might object that making such an argument would
make the new originalism a form of perfectionism (a type of
theory against which originalism defines itself). 5x But we should
distinguish, with Cass Sunstein, between first-order perfectionism and second-order perfectionism. First-order perfectionism
argues directly for interpreting or constructing the Constitution
so as to make it the best it can be. Second-order perfectionism
argues instead that adopting a particular theory of interpretation
or construction-whatever it is-will make the Constitution the
best it can be. 59
Even if Solum is not prepared to sign on with Dworkin and
me in first-order perfectionism, he should be willing to sign on
with Sunstein and make a second-order perfectionist case for his
theory. Indeed, such an argument is implicit in what he says in
making normative arguments for originalism from the rule of
law and popular sovereignty. He strongly suggests that applying
the new originalism will put our Constitution and constitutional
practice in their best light. Solum should make the argument
explicit: adopting the new originalisn1 and applying it will make
54. James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1335 (1997).
55. !d. at 1354.
56. BALKIN, supra note 8, at 3.
57. BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 10; DWORKIN, supra note 5; FLEMING, supra
note 5.
58. See Fleming, supra note 29, at 670 (suggesting that the only thing that the many,
balkanized varieties of originalism agree upon is their rejection of moral readings).
59. See Cass R. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism. 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2867,
2867-70 (2007).
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the Constitution and our constitutional practice the best they can
be.
At a minimum, Solum could leave it at that. Or, he could
embrace Balkin's method of text and principle, which is a firstorder perfectionist approach that would interpret and construct
the Constitution so as to redeem the promises of its
con1mitments. In doing so, he would put forward a new
originalism that is compatible with a moral reading or
Constitution-perfecting theory. That would be the best new
originalist approach for pursuing the aspiration to fidelity to our
imperfect Constitution.

